



**UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE SANTA MARIA
CENTRO DE CIÊNCIAS SOCIAIS E HUMANAS
PROGRAMA DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO EM FILOSOFIA**

DISCIPLINA: FAF 885 – Temas de Metaética III – 2025/1

PROFESSOR: Rafael Graebin Vogelmann

HORÁRIO: Quartas-feiras das 14:00 às 18:00. Início: 12/03/2024

1. Objetivos

A Metaética é o campo da Filosofia Moral que se ocupa de questões a respeito da natureza da moralidade e de nossos juízos morais e normativos. A moralidade é objetiva ou subjetiva? Há verdades morais? Se sim, elas são naturais ou não-naturais? Temos razão para agir moralmente? O curso se propõe a ser uma introdução geral ao debate contemporâneo em metaética. O objetivo é familiarizar os participantes com problemas e posições disponíveis nesse debate. Serão abordados as controvérsias entre cognitivistas e não-cognitivistas morais, entre naturalista e não-naturalistas morais e entre realistas e antirrealistas normativos.

2. Metodologia

Leitura, análise e discussão dos textos indicados para cada encontro.

3. Avaliação

A avaliação na disciplina consistirá em:

- a) Uma apresentação de Seminário em sala de aula
- b) Produção de um ensaio sobre temas relacionados aos textos listados na bibliografia da disciplina.

4. Programa (sujeito a alterações)

Aula 1 _ 12/03 – Apresentação do Curso. Naturalismo Definicional.

Texto: Mill – Utilitarismo (excertos)

Aula 2 _ 19/03 – O Argumento da Questão Aberta e Não-Naturalismo

Texto: Moore (1993 [1903]). Principia Ethica, Cap. 1.

Aula 3 _ 26/03 – Não-Cognitivismo: Emotivismo

Texto: Ayer (1991 [1936]). Linguagem, Verdade e Lógica. Cap. 6.

Aula 4 _ 02/04 – Teoria do Erro

Texto: Mackie (1997). Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Cap. 1.

Aula 5 _ 09/04 – Não-Cognitivismo: Prescritivismo

Texto: Hare - Universal prescriptivism

Aula 6 _ 16/04 – Naturalismo

Texto: Boyd (1988). How to be a Moral Realist

Brink (1984). Moral Realism and the Skeptical Arguments from Disagreement and Queerness.

Aula 7 _ 23/04 – Terra Gêmea Moral

Texto: Horgan, T. e Timmons, M (1996). From Moral Realism to Moral Relativism in One Easy Step.

Aula 8 – 30/04 – Não-Cognitivismo: Quasi-Realismo

Texto: Blackburn (1998). Attitudes and Contents.

Aula 9 _ 07/05 – Razões Internas e Externas

Texto: Foot (1972). Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives

Williams (1981). Internal and External Reasons

Aula 10 _ 14/05 – Teoria da Sensibilidade

Texto: McDowell (2002). Mind, Value and Reality. Cap. 7

Aula 11 _ 21/05 – Fundamentalismo de Razões

Texto: Scanlon, T. M. (2014). Being Realistic about Reasons. Lectures 1 and 2.

Aula 12 _ 28/05 – Evolutionary Debunking

Texto: Street (2006). A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value

Aula 13 _ 04/06 – Construtivismo Kantiano

Texto: Korsgaard (1996). The Sources of Normativity. Lecture 3

Aula 14 _ 11/06 – Moralidade e Perspectiva de Segunda-Pessoa

Texto: Darwall, S. (2006). The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability. Cap 1, 2 e 10.

Aula 15 _ 18/06 – Não-Cognitivismo: Expressivismo de Normas

Texto: Gibbard (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, Cap. 1 e 5

4. Bibliografia

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