**Federal University of Santa Maria (UFSM)**

**Human and Social Sciences Center**

**Departement of Philosophy**

**Discipline: Topics in Contemporary Philosophical Psychology and Philosophy of Mind**

**Year/Semester: 2020/1 & 2021/1**

**Professor: Dr. Farid Zahnoun**

**Course Overview**

This course will focus on important issues within contemporary Philosophical Psychology and Philosophy of Mind, with special attention being paid to recent developments and debates within Cognitive Science. To provide the necessary background, the course will start by giving an historical overview of the most relevant strands in these arias of philosophy. Subjects that will be treated include: representationalism, functionalism, computationalism, identity theory and 4E-Cognition. Giving such a survey will allow the student to situate the more recent developments in a broader historical context.

**Objectives**

Completing this course should provide the student with

1. knowledge of recent developments within Philosophical Psychology, Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Cognitive Science;
2. knowledge of the most foundational concepts and arguments in these arias of philosophy;
3. the ability to engage in philosophical discussions on issues related to mind and cognition;
4. the skill to critically evaluate arguments about the nature of mind and cognition, as well as the methodology used in the various philosophical domains;
5. the capacity to formulate their own position with respect to the issues discussed.

**Course contents**

1. The Cartesian legacy: Mind-Body Dualism
2. Logical and Methodological Behaviorism
3. Classic Idenitity Theory
4. Functionalism
5. Eliminativism
6. Computationalism & Representationalism
7. The Hard Problem of Consciousness
8. *Excursion:* reading Wilfrid Sellars’ *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man*
9. Embodied, Embedded, Extended and Enactive Cognition (4E-Cognition)
10. Predictive Processing/Predictive Coding Accounts

**Methodology**

- Seminars

- Reading sessions of important primary literature (in English)

- Group discussions

**Material**

- Power Point Slides

- Handouts of important primary and secondary literature

- Chapters from Jaegwon Kim’s handbook *Philosophy of Mind* (third edition)

- Wilfrid Sellars’ paper *Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man*

**Evaluation**

Presence and participation at the seminaries (obligatory) & paper on a topic related to the course (5 – 10 pages).

**Suggested Readings (in bold = course material)**

Block, N. (2006). Philosophical issues about consciousness. In Nadel, L. (Ed.), The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science: Wiley Online Library.

Broad, C.D.(1925). The Mind and its Place in Nature. New York: The Humanities Press Inc, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul LTD.

Chalmers, D. (1996). The Conscious Mind, New York: Oxford University Press.

Chemero, A. (2009). Radical embodied cognition. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

Davidson, D. (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Feigl, H. (1958). The “Mental” and the “Physical”’, in H. Feigl, M. Scriven and G. Maxwell (Eds.), Concepts, Theories and the Mind-Body Problem (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 2). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; reprinted with a Postscript in

Fodor, J. (1975). The Language of Thought. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell.

Fodor, J. (1980). Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive science. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3: 63–73.

Fodor, J. (1981). RePresentations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Gallagher, S. & Zahavi, D. (2008). The Phenomenological Mind. London: Routledge.

Hardcastle, V. (1996). The why of consciousness: a non-issue for materialists. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3: 7–13.

Heil, J. (2013). Philosophy of Mind. A Contemporary Introduction, 3rd edition. New York and London: Routledge.

Hurley, S. & Noë, A. (2003). Neural plasticity and consciousness. Biology and Philosophy 18: 131–168.

Hutto, D.D., & Myin, E. (2013). Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content. Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press.

Hutto, D.D., & Myin, E. (2017). Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content. Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press.

Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32: 127–136.

**Kim, J. (2011). Philosophy of Mind (3rd ed.). Westview Press.**

Kirchhoff, M. & Hutto, D.D. (2016). Never Mind the gap: neurophenomenology, radical enactivism and the hard problem of consciousness. Constructivist Foundations 11: 302–309.

McGinn, C. (1989). Mental Content. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945). Phénoménologie de la perception, Paris: Gallimard.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964). The battle over existentialism. In Sense and Non-sense. (Hubert L. Dreyfus & Patricia Allen Dreyfus, Trans.) Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press.

Noë, A. (2004). Action in Perception. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

228

**Place, U.T. (1956). Is consciousness a brain process? British Journal of Psychology 47: 44–50.**

**Ryle, G. (1949/2009). The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson.**

**Sellars, W. (1963). Philosophy and the scientific image of man. In Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd: 1–40.**

Silberstein, M. & Chemero, A. (2015). Extending neutral monism to the hard problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 22: 181–194.

**Smart, J.J.C. (1959). Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review 68: 141–156.**

Smart, J. J. C. (2017). The mind/brain identity theory. In N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition). URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/mind-identity/>.

Strawson, P.F. (1985). Skepticism and Naturalism. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd.

van Gelder, T. (1995). What might cognition be, if not computation? Journal of

Philosophy 92: 345–381.

Wittgenstein, L. (2009/1953). *Philosophische Untersuchungen/ Philosophical Investigations*. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker & Joachim Schulte, Revised fourth edition by P. M. S. Hacker & Joachim Schulte. Wiley-Blackwell: West-Sussex.

Zahavi D. (2018). Brain, Mind, World: Predictive Coding, Neo-Kantianism, and Transcendental Idealism. *Husserl Studies, 34*: 47-61.